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The effects of options listing and delisting in a short-sale-constrained 
market: Evidence from the Indian equities markets 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate short- and long-horizon effects of 237 option listings/relistings and 140 
delistings in a short-sale-constrained market—specifically, India’s National Stock Exchange 
from 2001 to 2012, when institutional short selling was either curtailed or banned outright. 
We find a strong positive impact on listings/relistings, signalling a favorable market 
perception of the event, but a negative impact on delistings. Over long horizons volatility is 
higher in both listed and delisted periods, especially the latter. We also find evidence to 
suggest that traders migrate from stock venues to (from) option venues following a listing 
(delisting), especially during short-sale bans.  
 
JEL classifications: G14, G28 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies suggest that trading in equity options improves liquidity, stability, and 
the informativeness of the underlying market (e.g., Beber & Pagano, 2013; Easley, O’Hara, 
& Srinivas, 1998; Kumar, Sarin, & Shastri, 1998; Ross, 1976). For instance, Kumar, Sarin, 
and Shastri (1998) find that options listing is associated with lower bid-ask spreads, higher 
depth and volume, and increased transaction size in the spot market. Other studies also 
document a positive response to options listing (e.g., Branch & Finnerty, 1981; Conrad, 1989; 
Detemple & Jorion, 1990), with few exceptions (Sorescu, 1999). 
A less explored argument revolves around the efficacy of equity options trading when 
an underlying market limits short sales (e.g., Figlewski & Webb, 1993; Miller, 1997). A ban 
on short sales effectively constrains bearish investors from trading on their information.5 This 
potentially results in overvaluation and subsequent corrections (e.g., Bris, Goetzman, & Zhu, 
2007; Chang, Cheng, & Yu, 2007; Fung & Dapper, 1999; Hong & Stein, 2003). Hong and 
Stein (2003) argue that a short-sale ban leads to underweighting of negative information, thus 
increasing the likelihood of crashes or extreme volatility. Bris and colleagues (2007) find that 
stock returns display significantly less negative skewing in the absence of short selling. Since 
options allow bearish trades, the listing of options may partially offset this illiquidity and 
instability brought on by short-sale constraints (e.g., Danielson & Sorescu, 2001); but there is 
little evidence about the role of option delistings in such markets. Additionally, it is hard to 
find evidence about the role of options listing/delisting for companies whose stocks 
                                                          
5 Previous evidence from multiple countries indicates a sharp decline in liquidity following a 
short-selling ban (e.g., Beber & Pagano, 2013). 
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underperform, where factors such as price stability may be much more important. In this 
study, we provide evidence on these important issues by examining the Indian stock market. 
There is a precedent to our investigation on the regulatory actions on leveraged 
trading in Indian markets. Before the introduction of derivative trading, the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (henceforth SEBI) introduced an indigenous trading system called 
“Badla,” allowing traders to buy stock with money borrowed from a stock exchange, under 
an agreement to repay the loan within 70 days, with interest.  As with options, regulators 
banned and then later allowed Badla with the view that the contracts undermine market 
efficiency. The effects of those regulatory measures appear inconclusive.6 
This study examines the immediate and long-horizon effects of listings/delistings 
(henceforth simply listings) of options in a short-sale-constrained market. The Indian equities 
market from January 2001 through 2012 presents an ideal laboratory for such an examination. 
During this period, under Indian securities law, options trading in a particular stock was 
suspended if that stock failed to meet certain trading and capitalization criteria. But the 
delisted options could be reinstated if certain (relisting) criteria were met. The eligibility 
                                                          
6 Before December 1993, there were 91 stocks that were classified as “most liquid” and 
qualified to trade under Badla. The system was blamed for excessive speculation, and in 
December 1993 SEBI announced that it would be discontinued as of March 14, 1994. In 
October 1995, SEBI reintroduced Badla in a more restricted and refined form, and it was 
legalized in 1996.  It was finally replaced by derivatives trading in 2001. Interestingly, the 
initial ban on Badla led to a 72 percent drop in the trading volume of its 91 stocks from April 
to December 1994; but also interestingly, the trading volume for non-Badla stocks increased 
17 percent during the same period (for more see Berkman & Eleswaeapu, 1998). 
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criteria for the listing and delisting of options centered around price performance and trading 
volume (see https://www.nseindia.com/products/content/derivatives/equities 
/selection_criteria.htm). Over the same period, institutional short selling was either prohibited 
or deeply constrained for all companies—a reaction by regulators to the stock market crash of 
2001. This ban was partially lifted in early 2008, when institutions were permitted to hold 
short positions up to but not beyond the close of a trading day.  
The period from 2008 to 2012, when the ban was only partial, provided sufficient 
time for the market to adjust to the less stringent regulatory environment, and gives us a 
window to examine the effects following an easing of short-sale constraints.7 
The Indian experience allows us to assess liquidity and volatility in a market with and 
without options trading in a short-sale-constrained environment. By contrast, short-sale 
                                                          
7 The regulators took the line that short selling may be destabilizing, although it may have its 
benefits:  
While international securities market regulators have recognized that short selling can 
exacerbate market falls and lead to manipulative activities, most of the jurisdictions 
have also recognized short selling as a legitimate investment activity that has 
contributed significantly to market liquidity. International securities market regulators 
have, therefore, permitted short selling with adequate safeguards to prevent any 
abusive/manipulative market practices. Similar issues may arise in the Indian context 
also. Genuine short selling could exacerbate price decline but that by itself may not be 
construed as a manipulative activity unless there are evidences of market misconduct 
(Discussion Paper on Short Selling and Securities Lending and Borrowing, Secondary 
Market Advisory Committee, SEBI, 2006). 
 
6 
 
constraints are rare in U.S. markets, so researchers examining U.S. data have had to use 
proxies for constraints to assess the effects of short selling. Figlewski and Webb (1993), 
among others, use the short-interest ratio; Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) use institutional 
ownership; Reed (2007) uses the rebate rate; and Diether and Werner (2010) employ a 
“threshold list.” We are fortunate in that we can dispense with such indirect means, much like 
Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007), who examine the Hong Kong market. 
Our focus is threefold. First, we assess the market perceptions regarding option 
listings versus delistings. Detemple and Selden (1991) note that prices generally rise when 
options are introduced. On the other hand, there is insufficient evidence about option 
delistings. Given that a delisting of an option on the NSE follows months of relatively weak 
performance in the underlying stock (see  https://www.nseindia.com/products/content/ 
derivatives/equities/selection_criteria.htm), it remains unclear from theoretical arguments 
whether equity traders will view a delisting as good or bad news. From the Indian regulators’ 
actions in setting short-sale rules and rules on derivatives in general, it follows that they 
likely view delisting options as a means to promote stock-price stability and deter trader 
manipulation,8 and a positive response to delistings will suggest that the markets affirm this 
view. On the other hand, arguments such as those put forth by Figlewski and Webb (1993) 
predict that delistings will increase instability, and by extension will be viewed negatively by 
the market. 
Second, and importantly from a regulatory perspective, we assess whether the listing 
and delisting of equity options are related to the long-horizon price stability of the underlying 
                                                          
8 Regulators in India have a long history of attempting to curtail what they view as 
manipulation in the derivatives market. For reviews of the recent history of regulation, see 
Youssef (2000) and Adrangi et al. (2014). 
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stock. The Indian regulators appear to believe that options trading in a company with 
declining capitalization is destabilizing. After all, an optionable stock with a declining price 
can be expected to witness dynamic hedge-based selling.9 To examine price stability, we 
examine whether return variability differs across the listing and delisting samples, while 
controlling for market volatility. Because listing and delisting events are unevenly spread 
throughout the sample, we face the possibility of confounding effects in the data. More 
specifically, we must deal with the relationship between the trading of options (or the lack 
thereof) and stock return volatility, while simultaneously dealing with the relationship 
between stock volatility and overall market volatility. Thus, we deploy a market volatility 
index to control our assessments of the stability of individual equities. A finding that 
volatility does not differ between listing and delisting periods would relieve the Indian 
regulators’ concerns. 
Third, we examine whether options listing promotes liquidity in the underlying stock. 
Our empirical work in this regard primarily assesses the frequency of trading (number of 
                                                          
9 We doubt that expiration-data effects play a major role in the Indian regulators’ perceptions, 
since all derivatives are cash settled. A steady stream of research argues for or against the 
relationship between physical delivery in the derivatives market and volatility in the 
underlying market. In particular, the delivery of physical assets has often been associated 
with increased market distortions, impacting price discovery and hedging efficiency, and cash 
settlement is offered as the better alternative (see, e.g., Chan & Lien, 2002). Opposing 
arguments suggest that it is indeed cash settlement, rather than physical delivery, that 
facilitates manipulation in commodity markets (e.g., Kumar & Seppi, 1992). On balance, 
there appears to be more support for cash settlement among academics and regulators for 
both options and futures contracts (e.g., Lien & Tse, 2006; Lien & Yang, 2005; Miller, 1986). 
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transactions) over the listing and delisting intervals. Note that other well-accepted measures 
of liquidity, such as volume and shares traded, are themselves criteria for relisting and 
delisting (see 
https://www.nseindia.com/products/content/derivatives/equities/selection_criteria.htm). 
However, SEBI’s decision to list or delist is likely taken many days before the announcement 
of the event or around the actual event itself, so our findings are not prone to simultaneity 
bias. 
In assessing the short-term market perceptions about options listing and delisting, we 
examine the announcement of the event as well as the actual event, because the actual listing 
or delisting can take place several days after the announcement. We employ abnormal returns 
for these purposes. To assess whether listings or delistings have a bearing on the long-horizon 
price stability of the underlying stock, we examine daily volatility. We employ actual listing 
and delisting dates for these tests and also for our examination of liquidity. To assess liquidity 
changes, we examine primarily the frequency of trading (number of transactions). In 
additional tests, we also examine trading dynamics using share and option volume.  
The next section lays out explanations for short- and long-horizon effects of options 
listing and delisting in a short-sale-constrained market. Section 3 reports the data and results, 
and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical evidence on the effects of options listing and delisting  
2.1.  Short-horizon effects with short-sale constraints 
2.1.1. Listings/relistings 
Intuitively, an options listing should be perceived as good news. Tse and Xiang 
(2005) find that derivatives trading increases market efficiency. Kumar and Tse (2009) 
demonstrate that in India single-stock futures contracts predict about 28% of information 
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share. More to the point, Wilkens and Roder (2006) study transactions data for the DAX and 
Bund futures options and find implied volatility to be predictive, even while implied 
skewness and kurtosis are not. 
 Within the Indian context, at the very least, an options listing suggests (i) that 
regulators (after necessary scrutiny) have validated leveraged trading on that stock (see 
https://www.nseindia.com/products/content/derivatives/equities/selection_criteria.htm), and 
(ii) that traders can now take leveraged positions beyond what is currently offered, inviting 
more informational trading. Thus, options listing may be expected to elicit a positive 
response in the underlying market. In fact, several studies show positive abnormal returns 
around options listings in the U.S. (e.g., Branch & Finnerty, 1981; Conrad, 1989; Detemple 
& Jorion, 1990; Faff & Hillier, 2005). 
However, the response to options listing also depends on the nature of the market and 
can be negative. Sorescu (1999) finds the price impact to be negative for options listed after 
1980. While Sorescu (1999) is unable to explain the reasons for this shift, Danielsen and 
Sorescu (2001) find a significant positive correlation between constraints on short selling and 
the negative price impact. Thus, short-selling constraints may actually cause a negative short-
term response to options listings. Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007) appear to support this view. 
They employ data from the Hong Kong market, where only stocks on a “short-sales list” can 
be shorted. Much like Indian regulations on options listing, the Hong Kong short-sales list is 
revised from time to time on the basis of price performance of the underlying stocks. Chang, 
Cheng, and Yu find a negative response when stocks are added to this list, suggesting that 
negative information fails to get sufficiently incorporated when short-sale constraints are in 
effect. Thus, it is possible that if options listing represents a substitute for short-sale listing, 
the experience in India could mimic that of Hong Kong. 
2.1.2. Delistings 
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The immediate effect of delisting is really an open question. In the Indian context, 
where delisting generally follows months of weak price performance, a positive response to 
delisting may arise from the perception that (i) options trading is a substitute for short selling, 
and (ii) a ban on options trading lessens the ability of bearish traders to take further leveraged 
positions against the stock. Both of these explanations point to a short-term positive response 
to delisting. This line of thought is supported by the widespread bans on short selling by 
financial institutions seen in 2008 (e.g., http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm). 
The U.S. SEC banned short sales on 799 stocks in September of that year. The bans did result 
in a short-lived bounce for financial stocks, as short sellers were squeezed (see “Bank shares 
rise on ban on short selling,” Guardian, August 12, 2011; “Short selling: Costs and benefits,” 
CenFis, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, November 2009; Battalio & Schultz, 2011).10  
                                                          
10 Battalio and Shultz (2011) suggest that their sample is short-sale constrained in that traders 
are at times not able to short stocks cheaply (see also Ofec & Richardson, 2003). In essence, 
they argue that short selling is subject to “indirect constraints” such as borrowing constraints, 
and they propose a threshold of misalignment between stocks and options prices that 
constrains short selling. Fortunately, we do not have to make such an assumption, nor do we 
have to rely on any such thresholds, since during our sample period there was either a total 
ban or tight controls on short selling. Note that while Battalio and Shultz examine the 
relationship between options and stock prices to assess whether short-sale constraints are 
responsible for price bubbles, we examine the effects of options listing and delisting on 
volatility and liquidity.  
 The constraints put on short sellers in 2008 remain controversial, with SEC Chairman 
Coz himself admitting afterwards that the ban may have been a mistake, and that it did not 
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But, on the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that negative perceptions about 
delistings per se may simply overwhelm any positive effects. Following a delisting, informed 
traders, who prefer an options venue (see, e.g., Black, 1975; Easley, O’Hara, & Srinivas, 
1998), will now have to migrate to equity markets. A bearish trend may thus be extended, at 
least in the very near term. Thus, the question about the immediate effects of options delisting 
in an underperforming stock is ultimately empirical and is examined using standard event-
study methods. 
2.2.  Long-horizon effects with short-sale constraints 
Our measure of long-term horizon effects is volatility, estimated using a GARCH 
framework. Black (1975) notes that the major attraction of options is their leverage, which 
enables informed traders to take large positions. Similarly, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas 
(1998) propose that informed traders would prefer options as long as the options market is 
sufficiently liquid.11 An increase in informed trading should lower information asymmetry in 
                                                          
ultimately prevent a further slide in financial stocks (SEC chief has regrets over short-selling 
ban, Reuters, Wednesday, December 31, 11:47 a.m. EST). 
 
11 Several studies indicate that options traders are informed. Pan and Poteshman (2006) 
provide strong evidence that options trading volume contains information about future stock 
prices. Amin and Lee (1997) find that options activity increases notably before quarterly 
earnings releases, and the direction of trading foreshadows earnings. Chan, Kot, and Ni 
(2011) find that options opening trades contain information about future stock returns, to 
horizons several months out. Kumar et al. (1998) find that, once options have been listed, 
specialists appear to pay more attention to the stock. This is taken as evidence that they 
regard options as important sources of price discovery. 
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the underlying stock market (see, e.g., Brennan & Cao, 1996), and in turn make returns less 
volatile (e.g., Detemple & Selden, 1991). It should be noted, however, that evidence about 
the effects of options trading on volatility is far from definitive. For instance, some studies 
find that volatility increases upon the introduction of index options (e.g., Chatrath et al., 
1995) or index futures trading (e.g., Gulen & Mayhew, 2000), while others find decreases in 
volatility (e.g., Bansal, Pruitt, & Wei, 1989; Edwards, 1988; Skinner, 1989).  Bansal and 
colleagues, who study individual options listing on the CBOE between 1973 and mid-1986, 
find that options listing reduces volatility and increases liquidity in a vast majority of stocks. 
Similarly, Skinner (1989) finds that the volatility of stock returns declines after options 
listing, and suggests that this may be due to informed trading. He also reports a rise in trading 
volume with the introduction of options. 
2.2.1. Short-sale-constrained markets, listings, and delistings 
If markets limit short selling, the benefits from options listing should be magnified. 
This can be explained by the following two points, considered together: (1) options represent 
a substitute vehicle for short traders, and (2) short-sales bans remove information and 
promote instability. The first point follows intuitively from the nature of options. For 
instance, the very foundation of options pricing models is built on the fact that the payoff of a 
put can be mimicked by trading Δ(-1<Δ <0) quantity of stock and lending an appropriate 
amount. Purists might argue that while puts may be mimicked via delta-shorting, a static 
short position may not be mimicked via put strategies (because of the limited number of 
strike prices, for instance). Nevertheless, even if short sales are not perfectly replicated by 
options strategies, their partial substitutability is undeniable: bearish traders deploy a number 
of partially self-financing strategies using call and/or put options. The second point, regarding 
why we should expect larger benefits from options listing in the face of short-selling bans, is 
that a lack of short selling leads to market inefficiencies that options can help correct. Miller 
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(1986) argues that short-sale-constrained markets will be overvalued, since optimistic 
(pessimistic) opinions will be overrepresented (underrepresented) in prices. Duffie, Garleanu, 
and Pedersan (2002) derive a framework in support of Miller’s overvaluation hypothesis, 
wherein short-sales constraints along with a divergence in opinion will result in mispricing. 
Similarly, Johnson (2004) suggests that constraining short sales will result in overshopping, 
with lower subsequent returns. Others, too, suggest that short-sale constraints may be 
destabilizing, though they do not necessarily suggest pricing bias. Diamond and Verecchia 
(1987) present a rational expectation framework in which bans on short sales may not lead to 
overvaluation, but will slow the incorporation of negative information into prices. 
Miller’s overvaluation hypothesis has a fair amount of empirical support (e.g., 
Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, & Tice, 2009; Chang, Cheng, & Yu, 2007; Figlewski & 
Webb, 1993; Gousgounis, 2012; Jones & Lamont, 2002). Notably, Giannikos and 
Gousgounis study overpricing in the Indian Nifty index over the period 2001–2008, when the 
institutional trading ban was in place. Measuring overpricing by the difference between the 
present value of Nifty futures and the underlying index, they find that overpricing does exist, 
especially in the presence of divergent opinion. While there is much evidence bearing on the 
overvaluation hypothesis, the evidence on whether the overvaluation increases volatility is 
mixed. Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007), using data from Hong Kong, document lower volatility 
when short sales are constrained, which may be an effect of informed trading. 
To summarize, theory suggests that options listing (delisting) should have a 
stabilizing (destabilizing) influence on the underlying market, especially in a short-sale-
constrained market such as the Indian market. However, given the evidence from short-sale 
listing and delisting in Hong Kong, the question about whether options listing and delisting 
decreases return volatility must be addressed empirically.      
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3. Data and results 
 Our study covers listings and delistings of options on individual equities on the 
National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) from 2001 to 2012. These options are traded at the 
NSE and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) using an electronic platform. Equity options 
began trading at the NSE in 2001, with the number of contracts traded more than doubling in 
each of the first 10 subsequent years. Over the 2001–2012 interval, there are a total of 257 
optionable stocks on the NSE, 237 events of listings (217 listings and 20 relistings), and 154 
events of delistings.12 
We obtain options listings and delistings dates from historical circulars available from 
the NSE. The stock information we use includes end-of-day prices, daily trading volume, and 
daily turnover, all from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess 
database. We also employ the closing values of the NSE’s CNX Nifty index (Nifty), which 
started trading in 1996 and represents a popular benchmark for Indian equities. We use the 
Nifty to capture daily market volatility, estimated with a GARCH (1,1) model using end-of-
day index returns. 
 Table 1 reports listings and delistings of options by year. Notice that listings are 
mostly evenly spread, with some clustering between 2005 and 2008, a period that witnessed 
strong market performance. For two of the three years without listings—2002 and 2009—the 
previous year saw sharp drops in the major Indian stock indexes. On a related note, the Nifty 
and Sensex (India’s other major stock exchange index) fell approximately 60% in the second 
half of 2008, and 30% in 2001. The listing criteria are based on moving-average performance 
(seehttps://www.nseindia.com/products/content/derivatives/equities/selection_criteria.htm). 
                                                          
12 When we disaggregate listings from relistings, the findings remain substantively similar. 
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Delistings, as we expected, cluster in 2009 (40%), a year that experienced rising stock index 
values. In summary, we do find that delistings are sampled from both falling and rising 
markets. However, because there is no overlap between the listing and delisting samples, any 
comparative tests should exert controls for market movements and volatility. 
 
Table 1 about here 
3.1. Unconditional summary statistics 
Table 2 provides distributional and autocorrelation statistics for our sample. For each 
stock, we compute return moments on the event date over the full sample period, the short-
sale ban period (4/2001–6/2008), and the partial curtailment period (7/2008–12/2012). 
We compute returns as the natural log of end-of-day dividend-adjusted prices: 
Rt=ln[Pt/Pt-1]*100. The summary statistics are then pooled across stocks over listing and 
delisting days. The moment statistics in Table 2 should be considered “unconditional” and 
preliminary, because no controls for market trend or volatility are imposed in these 
calculations. In addition to statistics on all listings and delistings (Panel A), we provide 
statistics for companies that experienced either a listing or a delisting (Panel B) and for 
companies that experienced both a listing and a delisting (Panel C). 
Panel A is very instructive. Average daily returns are higher after listings than after 
delistings. For instance, when short-selling constraints were most stringent (4/2001–6/2008), 
mean returns following listings were higher (0.074), more skewed (-1.719), and more kurtotic 
(14.495) than the corresponding moments following delistings (0.0594, -0.834, 10.064). Also, 
across the two subperiods, returns were more negatively skewed during 2001–2008 than 
during 2008–2012, a finding consistent with that of Bris and colleagues (2007), who find 
returns to be more negatively skewed in the presence of short sales. Similar findings appear 
in Panel B. In Panel C, for stocks that experienced both listing and delisting,  there is 
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preliminary evidence that volatility tends to be lower after listings than after delistings. 
Finally, the return autocorrelations are significant at three lags across all samples. Still, Table 
2 provides only preliminary guidance. 
Table 2 about here 
3.2. Short-term responses to options listing and delisting 
To assess short-term responses, we employ standard event-study methodology (see 
Brown & Warner, 1980), and as our benchmark portfolio we use the NSE’s Nifty index. This 
index is capitalization weighted and comprises 50 stocks that represent 22 industries. The 
event date, for our purpose, can be either (a) the date of announcement of the listing or 
delisting, or (b) the actual listing or delisting date. For both approaches, we deploy a 21-day 
(-10 to +10) window to assess responses. 
The estimated market model uses close-to-close returns for each stock, and is given 
by  
Rit=αi + βiRmt+Ɛit,       (1) 
where  Rmt = ln �
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1
� is the log of the corresponding Nifty index, αi and βi are regression 
coefficients for stock i, and Ɛit is the regression error. For stock i and day t, the abnormal 
return (AR) is computed as  
ARit = Rit - ( mti Rβα
 + ),      (2) 
from which we obtain the cross-sectional average abnormal return (AAR) for a sample of N 
stocks: 
AARit = ∑=
N
i
it
N
AR
1
 ,      (3) 
as well as the associated cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for event days t1 (-10 
days) through t2 (+10 days): 
CAARt= 2
1
t
tt=∑ AARt .       (4) 
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To construct tests of significance relating to AARs and CAARs, we calculate, as is 
customary, the standard deviation of abnormal returns for the period -210 days to -11 days for 
each company, which we use to obtain the standardized abnormal returns (SAR) over days -
10 ...+10 for each company. The test statistics for the average abnormal returns and 
cumulative average abnormal returns for N stock are given by ZAAR,t = 
N
SARitN
i 1=∑ and ZCAAR,t 
= 
NT
SARitt
ti
i
i *
2
1=
∑ , respectively, for T= 1,...21. 
We examine these events in two parts, the announcement of the listing or delisting 
versus the actual listing or delisting, for the following reasons.  First, looking at the 
announcement helps us assess perceptions regarding permission to trade options, while the 
announcement itself formally expresses regulators’ view of the underlying stock’s 
performance and liquidity. Second, the listing or delisting announcement may precede actual 
listing or delisting by as much as several months, so that the actual listing or delisting 
provides additional information about short-term performance arising from traders gearing up 
for a listing or gearing down for a delisting. 
 Table 3A reports the first set of results, relating to abnormal returns around the 
announcement. The AARs in particular are worth attention. As we expected, the listing 
announcements elicit a strong positive response on day 0 (announcement day), and this 
becomes stronger in the next two days. The relatively prolonged positive response (see 
CAARs) may indicate substantial hedge trading. The AAR also provides evidence, albeit 
brief, of information leakage in day -1. In general, the market appears to perceive a listing 
announcement as good news. 
 The results for delisting announcements vary more. The abnormal returns leading up 
to the event day are mixed, although they appear to be  positive on average. The AARs are 
strongly positive before the delisting announcement, but on the following day they turn 
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sharply negative, especially on the first two days after the announcement. The negative 
response is consistent with the view that delisting may promote instability (Figlewski & 
Webb, 1993).  
 In Table 3B we report results relating to the actual listings and delistings. For listings, 
the abnormal returns are significant and positive from day -5 through day -1 (see the AARs), 
suggesting buying pressure on the underlying stock as traders anticipate hedgers and/or large 
institutions entering the options markets. Nonetheless, the strength of the returns is surprising 
given that there was a previous announcement. The AARs beyond day -1 are generally 
insignificant, suggesting that the introduction of options trading in itself does not elicit any 
noteworthy trading responses. This finding could also signal trading movement away from 
the options venue, a possibility that we explore below in more detail. Notice the negative and 
significant coefficient on day +4, signalling possible overreaction. Interestingly, the 
responses associated with delistings are a near-mirror image of the responses to listings. 
There is a significant negative response leading up to the delisting but little noteworthy 
pattern following it, although the positive and significant coefficient on day +3 signals a 
possible overreaction.  
Table 3A and Table 3B about here 
Even though SEBI’s decision to list or delist is likely taken many days before an 
announcement, there may be concerns about endogeneity given that the variables used in our 
study are themselves requirements for a listing or a delisting. To address this issue we 
conduct tests similar to the tests noted above in Tables 3A and 3B on a control sample. For 
this purpose, we randomly sample a group of stocks matched by industry and asset size, and 
use t=0 as the announcement date of our listing/delisting (as in 3B). The results for the 
19 
 
control sample fail to show any consistent pattern, suggesting that the effects we find in our 
listing and delisting samples are indeed due to the announcement or the actual event itself.13 
Another issue is that the dynamics surrounding a relisting might differ from those 
surrounding a listing because traders are familiar with the stock. To examine this, we again 
conduct tests similar to tests reported in Tables 3A and 3B, and report these results in Table 
3C (relisting announcement) and Table 3D (relisting event). Despite many similarities, the 
responses are weaker than those to listings. As with listings, we find evidence of information 
leakage before relistings (see AARs on Day +1). And again, the AARs are significant before 
the actual event, though the responses are less pronounced. 
Table 3C and Table 3D about here 
3.3. Volatility across listed and delisted periods 
Tables 4A and 4B report volatility effects of option listings and delistings. We use the 
actual listing and delisting dates for this examination, as well as for the following 
examination of liquidity. The estimation framework is 
ʊi,t= ci+ βi,tʊI,t + ψiLt + +ti Dλ ei,t ,     (5) 
where ʊi represents a measure of conditional volatility, ʊI represents index volatility, and L 
and D are dichotomous (1,0) dummy variables for listed and delisted periods, respectively. 
We use an EGARCH approach to obtain conditional volatility. 
The approach accounts  for potential asymmetry in trader responses, given short-sale 
bans. The intercept, ci, captures the volatility over periods preceding options introduction for 
a particular stock. In the interest of robustness, we employ four alternate specifications to 
                                                          
13 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
20 
 
estimate volatility effects. These estimation frameworks are detailed in the Appendix, and 
include panel, cross-sectional (between effects), within-effects, and random-effects models.14 
The evidence across the models is consistent and shows that volatility increases after 
both listings and delistings but is more pronounced after delistings (see, e.g., the random-
effects model), as Wald tests confirm. At first blush, it might appear that the absence of 
options trading is associated with much greater volatility. This could be so. It is tempting to 
suggest that these results invalidate the regulatory rationale (of promoting stability). But the 
greater volatility may arise not simply from the absence of options trading in the underlying 
stock, but also from the fact that the delisting proxies weakness in that stock. We explore 
these issues further. 
Table 4A about here 
To further assess the potential role of short-sales constraints in the impact of options 
trading, we perform the above tests on listings and delistings, but only over the 2001–4/2008 
interval, which witnessed a complete ban on institutional short selling. The results for this 
sample are reported in Table 4B. As we suspected, the increase in volatility after delisting is 
                                                          
14 The test statistics are computed in the following manner. (i) We compute the redundant 
fixed-effect test (a) by restricting the cross-section fixed effects to zero to determine whether 
a model with cross-section fixed effects has more explanatory power than a pooled regression 
model and (b) by restricting period fixed effects (period chi-square) to zero to assess whether 
a period fixed-effect model has more explanatory power than one with cross-section fixed 
effects only. (ii) We use the Hausman test to assess whether random effects are uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables, that is, whether a random-effects model has more explanatory 
power than a fixed-effects model. 
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significantly higher than after listing, suggesting that the regulatory curbs have a hand in 
these effects. 
Table 4B about here 
 
3.4. Number of daily trades across listed and delisted periods 
To conduct a similar exercise for different measures of liquidity, we regress, 
alternatively, the logof the number of trades and the number of shares traded on the listing 
and delisting dummies over the sample period 2004–2012. Note that during 2001–2003, trade 
volume data is unavailable for most stocks. For brevity, Table 5 reports the results only for 
the number of trades variable. The findings show that options delisting significantly reduces 
trading frequency. Increases in trading after a listing are not significant at conventional 
levels. But in each of the four specifications, the coefficient of the listing dummy is 
statistically distinguishable from that of the delisting dummy, suggesting that the trading 
dynamics differ. Thus, we find that options trading is associated with significant changes in 
trading in the underlying stocks.15 
                                                          
15 For robustness, we examine trading dynamics around the actual listing and delisting events 
using a standard event window (-10 to +10 days), using T-tests. More specifically, we 
examine potential increases (decreases) in stock volume and the number of trades before and 
after listings (delistings). The results are summarized below (*** implies significance at the 
1% level). Once again, we note a significant increase in trading and volume after listings and 
a significant decrease in trading and volume after delistings. 
H0: Before(-10)=After(+10) Volume Number of Trades 
Listings 2.200*** 1.942*** 
Delistings -4.618*** -2.874*** 
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Table 5 about here 
3.5. Short-sale constraint regimes and short-term stock volume dynamics 
In the last part of this analysis, we examine the effects of differing short-sale regimes 
on stock volume. For ease of interpretation, we omit the intercept. Specifically, we conduct 
the following regression: 
STVi,t= 20082001,1 −iOTVα + 20122008,2 −iOTVα + 20082001,3 −iOTVα * Listing2001-2008+   (6) 
 20082001,4 −iOTVα * Delisting2001-2008+ 20122008,5 −iOTVα *Listing2008-2012+ 
20122008,6 −iOTVα * Delisting2008-2012+ʋi,t , 
where STV and OTV represent stock trading volume and options trading volume 
respectively. The results are shown in Table 6. The subscript 2001–2008 covers the period 
4/2001/–6/2008, while the subscript 2008–2012 covers the period 8/2007–2012. For this test 
we consider the announcement and event dates and the 10 days following these dates. For 
example, Listing2001-2008 represents OTV trading on the day of the options listing 
announcement and the ten days that follow, as well as the day of the actual listing and the ten 
days that follow. Because there is no trading of options after an actual delisting, in the 
equation above the delisting dummy represents only the announcement day and the 10 days 
of OTV after that announcement. 
Table 6 about here 
 The findings across all four models are consistent and provide two interesting 
insights. One, after a listing or a delisting there appears to be a shift in trading from one 
venue to another. Notice that the parameters β3 and β4 are both significant but have different 
signs. The negative coefficient on the former suggests that trading shifts away from stocks to 
options following a listing, and vice versa after a delisting (see, e.g., Easley, O’Hara, & 
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Srinivas, 1998). Two, during 2001–2008, when stringent controls were in place, the effects 
are magnified (see, e.g., β3 versus β5). 
 
4.  Summary and conclusions 
 We have attempted to answer three important related questions. 
(1) How does the market respond, in the short term, to options listing and delisting? 
We find a strong positive response to listings on the announcement day and for the next two 
days, plus evidence of information leakage about a forthcoming listing on the preceding day. 
After a delisting announcement, we find sharply negative responses, especially on the first 
two days. In short, traders respond strongly to these announcements. They also respond 
significantly to actual listings and delistings. In the run-up to an actual listing abnormal 
returns are positive and significant; in the run-up to an actual delisting, negative and 
significant. But there is little evidence of abnormal returns after that. Taken together, the 
evidence on listings is consistent with a long line of studies that find positive abnormal 
returns associated with options listings (e.g., Branch & Finnerty, 1981; Conrad, 1989; 
Detemple & Jorion, 1990; Detemple & Selden, 1991; Faff & Hillier, 2005). The negative 
responses to delistings may point to informed traders having to migrate away from option 
venues (see, e.g., Black, 1975; Easley, O’Hara, & Srinivas, 1998). The effects of differing 
short-sale regimes on stock volume suggest that traders migrate to option venues from stock 
venues after a listing and vice versa after delisting, and these effects are magnified during 
short-sale bans. 
(2) How do options listing and delisting affect daily volatility? We find that both 
listings and delistings elevate volatility, but this increase is significantly larger after delistings 
than after listings. During 2001–4/2008, when institutional short selling was completely 
banned, the increase after delistings was marginally larger. Other studies also find that 
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volatility rises after options listings or index futures listings (e.g., Chatrath, Ramchander, & 
Song, 1995; Gulen & Mayhew, 2000). Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002) suggest that 
short-sales constraints combined with a divergence in opinion can result in mispricing. Our 
findings may reinforce this notion. It might be useful for the regulatory body, the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India, to take note of our evidence. 
(3) Does options listing promote liquidity in the underlying stock? We find that 
options delisting significantly reduces the number of trades and that this effect differs 
significantly from that of listings. Robustness tests using a standard event window confirm 
that trading  accelerates after listings but decelerates after delisting. 
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Table 1  
Option listings and delistings by year.  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sample covers listings and delistings of options on individual equities on the National Stock Exchange of 
India (NSE) from 2001 to 2012. Over the 2001–2012 interval, there are a total of 257 optionable stocks on the 
NSE, 237 events of listings (217 listings and 20 relistings), and 140 events of delistings. 
  
Year Listing %Listing Delisting %Delisting 
2001 20 8% 0  
2002 0  2 3% 
2003 22 9 0  
2004 0  0  
2005 49 21 6 4 
2006 23 9 1  
2007 43 18 0  
2008 28 12 6 4 
2009 0  55 40 
2010 40 17 1  
2011 11 5 13 9 
2012 1  56 40 
Total 237   140   
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Table 2  
Daily moment statistics averaged across listings and delistings. 
 
Statistics 4/2001–2012 4/2001–07/2008 07/2008–2012 
Panel A Listing [237] Delisting [140] Listing [157] Delisting [9] Listing [80] Delisting [131] 
Mean (%) 0.029*** 0.0183 0.074*** 0.0594 0.016 -0.028 
Std deviation (%) 1.382 1.395 1.362 1.644 1.674 1.171 
Skewness -1.0003*** -1.174*** -1.719*** -0.834*** -0.380 -0.501*** 
Kurtosis 11.195*** 12.564*** 14.495*** 10.064*** 7.415*** 8.056*** 
Autocorrelation         
Lag-1 0.263*** 0.307*** 0.276*** 0.187*** 0.286*** 0.318*** 
Lag-2 0.051*** 0.084*** -0.014*** -0.042*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 
Lag-3 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 
Panel B Only a Listing or Only a Delisting 
N [97] [115] [62] [5] [35] [110] 
Mean (%) 0.0411 0.0216 0.082*** 0.061 0.006 -0.0366 
Std deviation (%) 1.411 1.381 1.453 1.736 1.666 1.682 
Skewness -0.816*** -1.141*** -1.394*** -0.422 -0.313* -0.557*** 
Kurtosis 10.116*** 11.768*** 11.689*** 7.54*** 6.727*** 8.53*** 
Autocorrelation         
Lag-1 0.218*** 0.313*** 0.236*** 0.167*** 0.193*** 0.361*** 
Lag-2 0.019*** 0.082*** -0.043*** -0.083*** -0.080*** 0.152*** 
Lag-3 0.034*** 0.081*** 0.001*** -0.010*** 0.081*** 0.119*** 
Panel C Both a Listing and a Delisting 
[N] [140] [9] [55] 
Mean (%) 0.0183 0.0594 0.012 
Std deviation (%) 1.395 1.644 1.751 
Skewness -1.174*** -0.834*** -0.531*** 
Kurtosis 12.564*** 10.064*** 7.465*** 
Autocorrelation    
Lag-1 0.304*** 0.187*** 0.353*** 
Lag-2 0.080*** -0.042*** 0.144*** 
Lag-3 0.081*** 0.003*** 0.112*** 
 
Daily statistics are calculated for each stock over listing and delisting event dates. The statistics are then 
arranged across stocks with listed options, and separately across stocks with delisted options. This is done for 
the full sample, 2001–2012, and the subsample, 7/2008–2012, during which short-selling restrictions were lifted 
to some degree. The sampling in this table includes only stocks that witnessed both listing and delisting of 
options during the sample period. The subscripts ***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively, from tests of equality between listing and delisting samples. 
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Table 3A  
Abnormal returns around options listing and delisting announcements. 
 
  Listings Delistings 
Event 
day AAR CAAR test Test AAR CAAR test Test 
      AAR CAAR     AAR CAAR 
-10 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.118 -0.118 0.006 0.006 1.992** 1.992** 
-9 0.0028 0.002 1.1704 1.12 0.00008 0.007 0.742 1.934* 
-8 0.003 0.005 1.616 1.848 0.018 0.025 5.812*** 4.935*** 
-7 -0.003 0.002 -1.823 0.689 0.0166 0.0042 5.204*** 6.876*** 
-6 0.001 0.003 0.597 0.883 0.003 0.045 0.881 6.544*** 
-5 0.0004 0.004 0.08 0.843 0.002 0.048 0.58 6.211*** 
-4 -0.003 0.001 -1.3 0.289 0.004 0.052 1.842 6.446*** 
-3 0.001 0.002 0.2 0.342 -0.007 0.044 -2.297** 5.218*** 
-2 0.002 0.006 1.52 0.832 0.008 0.053 2.881*** 5.880*** 
-1 0.004 0.01 2.33** 1.528 0.009 0.062 2.941** 6.505*** 
0 0.007 0.02 3.95** 2.651*** 0.0006 0.063 0.440 6.338** 
1 0.01 0.027 4.56*** 3.856*** -0.025 0.038 -8.351*** 3.658*** 
2 0.001 0.029 0.926 3.962*** -0.007 0.031 -2.41*** 2.742** 
3 -0.0004 0.028 -0.31 3.736*** -0.006 0.024 -3.538*** 1.903* 
4 0.001 0.030 1.11 3.895*** -0.001 0.026 0.842 2.056** 
5 0.005 0.035 2.580*** 4.417*** 0.0002 0.026 -0.081 1.970** 
6 0.001 0.036 0.793 4.447*** -0.0012 0.025 -0.098 1.881* 
7 0.0001 0.036 -0.166 4.31*** 0.007 0.032 3.185*** 2.585*** 
8 -0.003 0.033 -1.39 3.878*** 0.005 0.038 1.631 2.890** 
9 -0.002 0.0313 -1.35 3.477*** 0.002 0.041 0.233 2.870** 
10 -0.003 0.0285 -1.22 3.126*** 0.008 0.049 -2.099** 3.258*** 
         
 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and cumulative AARs are reported for days t-10 to t+10 with listing at t0. The 
market model is used to compute abnormal returns: ARit = Rit - ( mtii Rβα
 + ), where Rm is the daily return on 
the Nifty index. To construct tests of significance relating to AARs and CAARs, we calculate, as is standard, the 
standard deviation of abnormal returns for the period -210 days to -11 days for each company, which we use to 
obtain the standardized abnormal return (SAR) over days -10...+10 for each company. The test statistics for the 
average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for N stock are given by, ZAAR,t = 
∑=
N
i
it
N
SAR
1
 and ZCAAR,t= ∑=
it
ti
it
NT
SAR2
1 *
, respectively, for T=1,...21. ***, **, * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 3B  
Abnormal returns around options listing and delisting events. 
 
  Listings Delistings 
Event day AAR CAAR test test AAR CAAR test test 
      AAR CAAR     AAR CAAR 
-10 -0.007 -0.0007 -0.342 -0.342 -0.0045 -0.00459 -0.807 -0.807 
-9 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.023 -0.259 0.0007 -0.00382 -0.471 -904 
-8 -0.002 -0.0026 -1.586 -1.127 -0.0005 -0.0044 -0.891 -1.252 
-7 0.002 -0.0004 1.207 -0.372 0.002 -0.00167 0.565 -0.801 
-6 -0.0018 -0.002 -1.254 -0.893 0.004 0.00229 1.132 -0.21 
-5 -0.0056 0.0033 2.799*** 0.326 -0.001 0.00085 -0.096 -0.231 
-4 0.0027 0.0061 2.280*** 1.164 0.001 0.00186 0.841 0.103 
-3 0.0039 0.010 2.770*** 2.068 0.003 0.00489 0.763 0.366 
-2 0.014 0.0241 8.609*** 4.82*** -0.011 -0.00622 -5.729*** -1.564 
-1 0.006 0.03 3.376*** 5.64*** -0.005 -0.01186 -2.318** -2.217** 
0 -0.001 0.028 -0.848 5.122*** -0.0037 -0.0156 -2.845*** -2.972*** 
1 0.001 0.03 -0.944 5.177** 0.0043 -0.01125 1.791* -2.32** 
2 0.003 0.033 1.818* 5.428*** -0.0012 -0.01246 -0.543 -2.301** 
3 0.0009 0.034 0.721 5.471*** 0.00415 -0.00831 2.691*** -1.581 
4 -0.005 0.029 -2.518*** 4.636*** -0.0022 -0.0105 0.137 -1.492 
5 -0.0007 0.028 -0.66 4.323*** 0.00274 -0.00776 0.270 -1.377 
6 -0.0000 0.028 -0.019 4.198*** 0.0002 -0.00752 -0.130 -1.367 
7 0.0001 0.029 -0.426 3.979*** -0.0106 0.01812 -3.633*** -2.185** 
8 0.001 0.029 0.944 4.019*** 0.0065 -0.01163 1.627 -1.753* 
9 0.0014 0.028 -1.094 3.742*** 0.009 -0.00212 3.041*** -1.029 
10 -0.0015 0.027 -1.301 3.368*** -0.0002 -0.0024 .134 -0.975 
 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and cumulative AARs are reported for days t-10 to t+10 with delisting at t0. 
The market model is used to compute abnormal returns: ARit = Rit - ( mtii Rβα
 + ), where Rm is the daily return 
on the Nifty index. To construct tests of significance relating to AARs and CAARs, we calculate, as is standard, 
the standard deviation of abnormal returns for the period -210 days to -11 days for each company, which we use 
to obtain the standardized abnormal return (SAR) over days -10...+10 for each company. The test statistics for 
the average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for N stock are given by ZAAR,t = 
∑=
N
i
it
N
SAR
1
 and ZCAAR,t= ∑=
it
ti
it
NT
SAR2
1 *
, respectively, for T=1,...21. ***, **, * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3C  
Abnormal returns around relisting announcements. 
 
Relistings 
Event 
day AAR CAAR test test 
      AAR CAAR 
-10 0.0088 0.0088 1.5543 1.554 
-9 0.0014 0.0102 0.1622 0.982 
-8 -0.002 0.0082 -0.4463 0.897 
-7 0.001 0.0092 0.3822 0.963 
-6 0.0087 0.0005 -2.0162** 0.042 
-5 0.0078 0.0083 1.3414 0.545 
-4 0.0084 0.0004 -1.2546 -0.008 
-3 0.0006 0.0007 -0.1429 -0.051 
-2 0.0156 0.0149 2.1328** 0.930 
-1 0.0027 0.0122 -0.5818 0.660 
0 0.0034 0.0156 0.4333 0.689 
1 0.0106 0.0262 2.5698*** 1.148 
2 0.0008 0.0254 -0.1729 1.102 
3 0.0053 0.0307 0.9132 1.262 
4 0.0051 0.0358 0.677 1.394 
5 0.0037 0.0395 1.0676 1.558 
6 0.0046 0.0441 0.8656 1.648 
7 0.0106 0.0547     1.8672* 1.852* 
8 0.0061 0.0486 -1.0181 1.526 
9 0.0033 0.0453 -0.4569 1.372 
10 0.0055 0.0398 -1.3084 1.152 
 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and cumulative AARs are reported for days t-10 to t+10 with relisting at t0. 
The market model is used to compute abnormal returns: ARit = Rit - ( mtii Rβα
 + ), where Rm is the daily return 
on the Nifty index. To construct tests of significance relating to AARs and CAARs, we calculate, as is standard, 
the standard deviation of abnormal returns for the period -210 days to -11 days for each company, which we use 
to obtain the standardized abnormal return (SAR) over days -10...+10 for each company. The test statistics for 
the average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for N stock are given by ZAAR,t = 
∑=
N
i
it
N
SAR
1
 and ZCAAR,t= ∑=
it
ti
it
NT
SAR2
1 *
, respectively, for T=1,...21. ***, **, * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3D  
Abnormal returns around relisting events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and cumulative AARs are reported for days t-10 to t+10 with relisting at t0. 
The market model is used to compute abnormal returns: ARit = Rit - ( mtii Rβα
 + ), where Rm is the daily return 
on the Nifty index. To construct tests of significance relating to AARs and CAARs, we calculate, as is standard, 
the standard deviation of abnormal returns for the period -210 days to -11 days for each company, which we use 
to obtain the standardized abnormal return (SAR) over days -10...+10 for each company. The test statistics for 
the average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for N stock are given by ZAAR,t = 
∑=
N
i
it
N
SAR
1
 and ZCAAR,t= ∑=
it
ti
it
NT
SAR2
1 *
, respectively, for T=1,...21. ***, **, * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Relistings 
Event day AAR CAAR Test Test 
      AAR CAAR 
-10 0.0058 0.0058 1.022 1.022 
-9 -0.0078 -0.002 -1.376 -0.25 
-8 0.0054 0.0034 0.962 0.351 
-7 0.0115 0.0149 2.022** 1.315 
-6 -0.0080 0.007 -1.404 0.548 
-5 0.011 0.0179 1.936* 1.219 
-4 0.0053 0.0233 0.936 1.549 
-3 0.0035 0.0268 0.621 1.668 
-2 0.0207 0.0476 3.646** 2.789*** 
-1 0.0113 0.059 1.996** 3.277*** 
0 -0.011 0.0481 -1.959** 2.533*** 
1 0.0045 0.0524 0.801 2.657*** 
2 -0.0003 0.0522 -0.067 2.534*** 
3 -0.0059 0.0462 -1.043 2.163** 
4 -0.0112 0.0349 -1.971** 1.581 
5 0.0008 0.0357 0.149 1.568 
6 0.0026 0.0383 0.47 1.635 
7 0.006 0.0444 1.062 1.839* 
8 0.0092 0.0537 1.619 2.162** 
9 0.0006 0.0543 0.114 2.133** 
10 -0.0126 0.0418 -2.222*** 1.596 
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Table 4A  
GARCH volatility across listing and delisting events. 
 
  Pooled Between Effects Within Effects Random Effects 
C 0.104***(18.68) 0.239***(9.915) 0.176***(17.05) 0.104***(3.885) 
Index volatility 2.457***(26.16) 0.972*(1.760) 1.981***(14.27) 2.815***(7.775) 
Options listed (L) 0.035***(3.959) 0.048***(5.568) 0.0253(1.452) 0.149***(3.113) 
Options delisted (D) 0.093***(8.011) 0.084***(6.823) 0.081***(3.707) 0.230***(3.968) 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.30 0.08 0.037 
Redundant fixed     
effects (F-stat)  1.739***   
Period fixed effects   1.18  
Cross-section random (rho)    0.00 
Hausman (Cross-section 
random )    0.86 
H0: L=D 16.954*** 5.801** 4.261** 1.226 
     
     
     
Four panel regressions are conducted over the period 2001–2012: pooled, fixed cross-section effects, and random effects. 
These models are detailed in the Appendix. Conditional volatility is obtained from an EGARCH framework that accounts 
for asymmetry in responses. Volatility is regressed on index volatility and dichotomous dummy variables for options 
listed (L) and delisted (D) for the dates listed or delisted. The intercept is permitted to capture periods before options were 
introduced for a particular stock. Each model is estimated via GLS. Adjusted R2 tests whether the alternate model is 
superior to the pooled regression. ***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4B  
Volatility across listing and delisting events with short-sale constraints: 2001–4/2008. 
 
  Pooled 
Between 
Effects Within Effects 
Random 
Effects 
C 0.105***(16.29) 0.080(1.089) 0.169***(11.364) 0.141***(5.416) 
Index volatility 2.382***(22.60) 3.369***(2.885) 2.170***(11.36) 2.227***(6.384) 
Options listed (L) 0.033***(3.701) 0.043***(5.852) 0.004(0.195) 0.050(1.066) 
Options delisted (D) 0.105***(5.988) 0.084***(6.823) 0.081***(3.707) 0.230***(3.968) 
Adjusted R2 0.269 0.412 0.079 0.044 
Redundant fixed     
effects (F-stat)  2.069***   
Period fixed effects   1.001  
Cross-section random (rho)    0.00 
Hausman (Cross-section 
random )    0.86 
H0: L=D 13.919*** 15.010*** 2.831 14.288*** 
 
Four panel regressions are conducted over the period 2001–4/2008, a period that saw a complete ban on short 
sales. The regression frameworks are pooled, fixed cross-section effects, within effects, and random effects. 
These models are detailed in the Appendix. Conditional volatility is obtained through an EGARCH framework 
that accounts for asymmetry in responses. Volatility is regressed on index volatility and dichotomous dummy 
variables for options listed (L) and delisted (D) for the dates listed or delisted. The intercept is permitted to 
capture periods before options were introduced for a particular stock. Each model is estimated via GLS. 
Adjusted R2 tests whether the alternate model is superior to the pooled regression. ***,**,* represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 5  
Number of trades on listing and delisting event dates. 
 
  Pooled Between Effects Within Effects Random Effects 
C 8.337***(233.04) 8.35***(240.15) 8.337***(232.75) 0.141***(5.416) 
Options listed (L) 0.141(1.234) 0.221 (1.841) 0.142 (1.239) 0.050(1.066) 
Options delisted (D) -0.266***(-2.019) -0.570***(-3.963) -0.269***(-2.030) -0.365***(-2.750) 
Adj R2 0.002 0.08 -0.000 0.003 
Redundant fixed     
effects (F-stat)  1.718***   
Period fixed effects   0.443  
Cross-section random (rho)    0.07 
Hausman (Cross-section 
random )    0.75 
H0: L=D 5.947*** 18.21*** 6.009** 9.799*** 
 
The log of transactions for each company is regressed on dichotomous dummy variables for options listed (L) 
and delisted (D) days. Four panel regressions are conducted using data from 2001–2012: pooled, fixed cross-
section effects, and random effects. These models are detailed in the Appendix. The intercept term is permitted 
to capture periods before options were introduced for a particular stock. Each model is estimated via GLS. 
Adjusted-R2 tests whether the alternate model is superior to the pooled regression. ***,**,* represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6  
Trading dynamics: stock volume, options volume, and short-sale regimes. 
 
Variable Pooled Individual Two-Way Random 
1β  [Options volume2001-2008] 0.711*** -0.002 0.403*** 0.008 
2β  [Options volume2008-2012] 0.865*** 0.003 0.688*** 0.015*** 
3β  [Options volume2001-2008*Listing2001-2008] 0.110*** -0.032*** -0.013*** -0.327*** 
4β  [Options volume2001-2008*Delisting2001-2008] 0.288*** 0.087*** 0.027*** 0.085*** 
5β  [Options volume2008-2012*Listing2008-2012] -0.226*** -0.063*** 0.003 -0.08*** 
6β  [Options volume2008-2012*Delisting2008-2012] 0.134*** -0.20*** -0.011*** -0.031*** 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.071 0.03 0.09 
H0: 1β = 2β  70.07*** 1.01 46.68*** 2.45 
H0: 1β = 3β  164.74*** 12.94*** 137.50*** 22.33*** 
H0: 1β =  4β  118.69*** 212.18*** 101.24*** 164.90*** 
Tions  415.42*** 23.15*** 712.10*** 40.44*** 
H0: 2β = 6β  1744.74*** 7.85*** 740.50*** 24.25*** 
H0: 3β = 5β  26.34*** 0.38 0.40 2.58* 
H0: 4β = 6β  23.02*** 38.98*** 18.10*** 51.07*** 
H0: RE better than FE    34.02** 
 Cross-section random rho       0.77 
 
Four panel regressions are conducted over the period 2001–2012: pooled, individual cross-section effects, two-
way effects, and random effects. These models are detailed in the Appendix of this paper. Stock volume is 
regressed on options volume for the period 2001–2008, options volume for the period 2008–2012, and four 
interaction variables: options volume and listings during 2001–2008, options volume and delistings during 
2001–2008, options volume and listings during 2008–2012, and options volume and delistings during 2008–
2012. All models are estimated with heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note that the subscript 
2001–2008 covers the period 4/2001–6/2008, while the subscript 2008–2012 covers the period 7/2008–2012. 
For this test, we consider the announcement and event date and the 10 days following a delisting (after the 
actual date). The delisting dummy represents only the announcement day and the 10 days of options trading 
after that announcement.  
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Appendix: Alternate specifications 
A.1. Pooled regression model 
 The simplest approach, with which our analysis begins, is pooled OLS regression. This is 
expressed as follows: yit = α0+ βxit + Ɛit , where i = 1,2,...N represents the number of entities, t = 1, 
2,...T represents the time period, and xit is a 1xk vector of explanatory variables. In pooled regressions 
the intercept and slope coefficients remain constant over time and entities. 
A.2. Fixed (cross-sectional) effects model 
 We use the cross-sectional fixed effects model to capture heterogeneity across entities, 
represented by αi. The cross-sectional fixed effects model is expressed as follows: yit = αi + βxit + Ɛit , 
where αi, the intercept, is different for every firm but remains constant over time, and xit is a 1xk 
vector of explanatory variables. 
A.3. Fixed (time) effects model 
 We use the time fixed effects model to capture the heterogeneity of every individual over 
time, represented by αt. The time fixed effects model is expressed as follows: yit = αt + βxit + Ɛit , 
where the intercept changes over time for every firm. xit is a 1xk vector of explanatory variables. 
A.4. Random effects model 
 The random effects model allows an intercept for each cross-sectional unit to arise from a 
common intercept term α (which remains the same for all cross-sectional units and over time) and a 
random variable Ɛi, which measures the random standard deviation of each unit’s intercept term from 
the overall intercept term α (Brooks, 2008). 
 yit = αi + βixit + wit, wit  =  Ɛi + vit ,  
where i = 1,2,...N represents the number of entities, and t = 1, 2,...T represents the time period. xit is 
still a 1xk vector of explanatory variables, but unlike the fixed effects model, the random effects one 
has no dummy variables to capture the heterogeneity in the cross-sectional dimension. It is assumed 
that the new cross-sectional term, Ɛi, has zero mean and constant variance. Ɛi is independent of vit and 
the explanatory variable, xit. Generalized least squares is used to estimate the random effects panel. 
